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Abstract. The contemporary world is in an era of mega-crises, caused by 
a host of physical, economic, political, social, and cultural factors. Through 
a step-by-step explication of the root concepts of problem, mess, and crisis, 
a mega-crisis is posited to be a set of interacting crises that are severe in 
impact, complex in nature, and global in fallout, with no seeming end in 
sight. Compared to a crisis, a mega-crisis is higher in severity and deeper 
in complexity. The paper argues for a stakeholder perspective in mega-
crisis response, as relying on the organizational standpoint is inadequate 
for reaching long-term resolutions.  
1 Introduction 
In spite of its many innovations, opportunities and resources, the contemporary era can be 
viewed as one of a series of mega-crises, caused by a complex interplay of physical, 
economic, political, social, and cultural factors [1]. Due to its scale, complexities, and 
impact on many publics, the African famine can be considered a mega-crisis, i.e., “a 
complex constellation of political, religious, cultural, and commercial crises involving not 
only the media, governments, ambassadors, religious leaders, and citizens from many 
countries, but also private companies…” [2]. The issues are multi-faceted and related. 
At the crux of the famine mega-crisis is a series of interacting problems, messes, and 
crises. These are some of the contributing factors [3]: Poverty;  increasingly unpredictable 
weather which has the potential to reduce annual crop yields; drought; groundwater 
contaminated by pollution and deadly microorganisms; diminishing grain reserves;  
differential access to global commodities markets; distribution problems in allocating food 
resources; corruption;  the variable price of oil; increasing meat consumption and 
concomitant diversion of grain to livestock rather than to humans; and increasing 
proliferation of agro-fuels, which similarly diverts grain away from human consumption.  
Despite awareness of these various factors, responses by most international agencies 
remain predictable with every cycle of the famine problem in Africa: Provide food aid, 
provide loans to buy food (with interest), and provide technologies for more productive and 
efficient farming. Such seemingly reasonable measures, predominantly driven by 
authorities, are limited in their effectiveness because they fail to address the multiplicity of 
factors involved. Long-term solutions lie within a much broader web of social, political, 
and economical entanglements. 
The paper endeavors to further the explication on mega-crisis, as guided by the logic of 
concept explication process [4]. This includes describing what a mega-crisis is and why it is 
different from conventional definitions of a crisis; examining empirical properties of a 
                                                 
* Corresponding author: yyen001@e.ntu.edu.sg 
 
 
    
 
 
DOI: 10.1051/, 00034 (2017) 73300034
 
33SHS Web of Conferences shsconf/201
i-COME'16 
 © The Authors,  published  by EDP Sciences.  This  is  an  open  access  article  distributed  under  the  terms  of  the 
Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). 
  
	
mega-crisis; and developing a tentative conceptual definition. The paper also discusses 
feasible responses to a mega-crisis.  
2 Significance and opportunities 
Currently, the application of crisis communication theory in a mega-crisis is inadequate. 
This is primarily because most seminal research responses are grounded in the perspectives 
and interests of an organization or perhaps an industry, which is insufficient in 
understanding a mega-crisis. Second, current definitions of a mega-crisis require further 
explication, as there are more attempts to define a mega-crisis in terms of what it is not 
rather than what it is. The paper begins by tracing the root concepts of problems, messes, 
and crises.  
3 Literature review 
3.1 Root concept: Problem 
The explication process starts with tracing the root concepts of crisis and examining the 
critical similarities and differences in their escalating properties. At the most basic level is a 
problem. A problem must satisfy three conditions: “First, a decision-making individual or 
group has alternative courses of action available; second, the choice made can have a 
significant effect; and third, the decision maker has some doubt as to which alternative 
should be selected” [5].  A problem tends to be defined at a micro level, i.e., involving an 
individual or organization facing a decision. 
There are three generally accepted ways to manage a problem: Resolve, solve, or 
dissolve [5]. First, the clinical approach would be to resolve a problem by choosing the 
method that yields a good-enough outcome, based on past experience and consultation of 
best practices. Second, the research approach would be to solve a problem by achieving the 
best results based on empirical evidence from primary research or statistical modeling and 
simulations. Third, the design approach would be to dissolve a problem by changing the 
environment in order to remove the problem [6]. It demands a different way of approaching 
the issue, by seeing the problem and possible solutions from a structural perspective.  
3.2 Escalated concept 2: Mess 
The next escalated concept from a problem is referred to as a mess [5], which is a large and 
complex set of interacting problems. Problems constituting a mess rarely can be clinically 
separated and analyzed for solutions [7]. In this regard, any single solution that professes to 
effectively solve or resolve a mess can only mean a misreading of the situation, i.e., it 
would not have been a mess, much less a crisis. A mess is the outcome of interacting 
problems [8] and is more complex than a single problem.  Problems and messes also 
typically do not reach the threshold of media attention, which is a key factor to distinguish 
problems and messes from the more severe stages of crises and mega-crises. An example of 
a mess would be to discourage anti-littering behavior. Interacting problems may include a 
lack of litter bins, inconspicuous litter bins that are badly designed and placed in less-
accessible spots, poor enforcement of anti-littering penalties, and dim lighting of the area 
etc. Resolving any one of these problems may not resolve the mess, as problems are 
intertwined. It is possible that all related problems have to be tackled holistically in order to 
yield positive results from the mess.  
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3.3 Escalated concept 3: Crisis 
A crisis can have severely negative consequences for an organization.  It is not a normal 
occurrence in the everyday flow of business. Defined as “a turning point for the 
organizational life” [9], it usually changes an environment drastically and irreversibly. A 
crisis is also a disruption that can threaten the existence of an organization [10]. The 
severity can “damage – even terminally – a company and individual careers, and can 
produce interminable legal suits and government investigations that can disrupt operations 
and smooth running of a company for years” [11]. This impact has largely to do with the 
presence of media as a multiplier in amplifying the crisis [12], thus exposing the 
reputational assets of an organization to risk.  
A crisis goes through five common stages:  detection, prevention or preparation, 
containment, recovery, and learning [10]. Detection involves the noting of warning signs 
that can lead to a crisis if unabated. Prevention involves either averting the crisis, lessening 
the impact of the crisis, or limiting the duration of the crisis. Crisis preparedness, which is 
driven by perceived seriousness and perceived controllability, can result in an 
organization’s willingness to plan for a crisis scenario [13]. Containment refers to efforts 
that limit the duration or the spread of the crisis. Recovery happens when the organization 
adapts to an altered environment and set of practices precipitated by the crisis. Lastly, 
learning is the process of studying the crisis and taking stock of losses and gains. Learning 
will also improve detection of warning signs in the future.  
The way crisis stages are managed is determined by an organization, as it both faces 
adverse consequences and possesses resources to ameliorate the crisis. The organization 
can adopt either a managerial perspective or a political perspective [14]. The former 
involves crisis managers devising a comprehensive strategy for crisis response. Most crisis 
theories have been derived from a managerial perspective: Apologia theory (to defend and 
protect image), image restoration theory (what is threatening image and which publics must 
be managed to redress image loss), decision theory (issues management and crisis 
prevention strategies), diffusion theory (how new procedures are accepted by the 
organization), and excellence theory (how organizations communicate with stakeholders) 
[10]. These theories consider organizational interests as a start point. 
The latter – political perspective – is less concerned with functional responses to a 
crisis, and is purposed towards understanding its “social significance and political 
management that is partly determined by [its] psychological impact on the communities 
affected and the political choices that play up or down the importance, unacceptability and 
urgency of the events” [14]. In consulting the perspectives of affected stakeholders, the 
organization is able to assess the crisis comprehensively. The political perspective accepts a 
crisis as an ill-structured mess, which is an interacting set of ill-structured problems [8]. An 
ill-structured crisis, in turn, means that stakeholders have differing views, according to 
different backgrounds, values and interests. A political perspective posits that “every crisis 
is an existential crisis in meaning” [7]. 
 
3.4 Escalated concept 4: Mega-crisis 
A mega-crisis is more severe and complex than a crisis, where both managerial and 
political perspectives are required to manage the situation. This is because a mega-crisis 
creates “deep uncertainty, and evoke(s) an extreme sense of urgency” [15]. Together, these 
two components are seemingly incompatible because a problem with deep uncertainty 
requires time to unravel, yet time is not available due to extreme urgency. 
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 It is the extreme urgency of a mega-crisis that demands a managerial perspective. Due 
to media pressure, an organization must provide immediate relief to save lives and preserve 
property. However, as in the case of the African famine, quick and necessary responses in 
providing food aid, for example, do not address the core issues of a mega-crisis. Urgency 
can be a red herring to the real issues of a mega-crisis, where stopgap measures 
masquerade as long-term solutions due to public pressure. 
 
Proposition 1a: A managerial perspective, adopted by the organization in a mega-crisis, is 
likely to meet urgent stakeholder needs.  
 
Proposition 1b: A managerial perspective, adopted by the organization in a mega-crisis, is 
less likely to provide long-term resolutions. 
 
Although the root word mega connotes very large or out-of-the-norm values, a mega-
crisis is not simply a bigger crisis [16]. As mega crises evolve due to environmental 
changes, new emerging challenges require paradigm shifts in order for managers to cope. 
Consider the multifold complexities invariably linked with the concept of a mega-crisis – 
mega-disasters, mega-threats, mega-risks, mega-responses, mega-reactions and mega-
opportunities – and one would begin to see the extensive work required in elevating crisis 
literature to mega-crisis levels. Thus, a mega-crisis has been defined as the “embedded 
engine of a chaotic world that evolves and mutates through global dynamics whose texture 
is made up of complex, unstable webs of constant, global, major dislocations” [16]. 
Globalization is a critical component in the identification of a mega-crisis [2, 17-18].  
Also referred to as a modern crisis [8], a mega-crisis has an element of perpetuity, i.e., 
it is without a clear beginning or end. Characteristics of a mega crisis keep mutating [19] 
and its severity is not limited to the loss of lives and property, but potentially the legitimacy 
of the state as well. These challenge the five stages of a crisis because mega-crises remain 
in prolonged limbo [20], unresolved over time because of overwhelming complexities and 
waning public attention. Optimism bias, which refers to a perception that others are more 
susceptible to the risk of negative events, can happen to the organization [21]. This implies 
that mega-crisis managers may avoid or deny a scenario that is deemed too severe to 
comprehend. While a mega-crisis can be contained, recovery may not be in sight.  
Beyond immediate responses in meeting extremely urgent needs, the political 
perspective is needed to address the component of deep uncertainty. Such is the level of 
uncertainty in a mega-crisis that past crises have limited value for understanding 
tomorrow’s crises [22].  
To truly understand a mega-crisis requires an appreciation of a state of constant flux, 
and black boxes of various disciplines and their tensions. It is an ill-structured mess [8], 
where different groups of stakeholders will define its problems based on their “values, 
interests, education, personal history, and the organizations for which they work”. Every 
modern crisis is inter-disciplinary and even trans-disciplinary in nature, requiring a diverse 
community of professionals in many different fields for cooperation and integration in 
order to design a viable solution [7]. 
 
Proposition 2: A political perspective, adopted by the organization in a mega-crisis, is 
likely to provide long-term resolutions.  
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4 Discussions: Empirical Properties of a Mega-Crisis 
The empirical properties of a mega-crisis are as follows. First, the mega-crisis is a complex 
set of interacting crises [5], in which there is “deep uncertainty” [15], and the absence of a 
simple or single resolution. An inter-disciplinary and even trans-disciplinary approach is 
needed to comprehend and manage this uncertainty [8]. Second, a mega-crisis has global 
implications [2]. Mega-crisis managers will need to grapple with the diverse cultural 
backgrounds and other differences of various publics. Third, a mega-crisis evokes a sense 
of perpetuity, with no distinct start and endpoint. Although intense media attention may 
heighten urgency in dealing with a mega-crisis in the short-term [19], media and public 
interest will decline when complexities unfold over time [20].   
 
Fig 1. Mega-crisis mapping model 
 The mega-crisis mapping model is thus proposed. The x-axis illustrates the complexity 
and the y-axis illustrates the severity of a mega-crisis. First, a problem is low in complexity 
and severity, which makes it possible to solve it categorically or resolve it from a 
managerial perspective (organizational discretion). Second, a mess is high in complexity 
but low in severity. As problems are interacting, it is not possible to isolate them for 
resolution. Third, a crisis is low in complexity but high in severity. It is possible to prepare 
for and prevent a crisis from happening. It is also possible to contain and recover from a 
crisis, based how others have done so. As such, a managerial perspective can be applied. 
Lastly, a mega-crisis is the highest entity of the four in terms of complexity and severity. 
Mega-crisis managers have to deal with extremely urgent demands from stakeholders but 
yet be able to consider a long-term dissolution of the situation. Wide consultation of 
stakeholders will be required, through experts, in order to fully understand the situation, 
propose socially legitimate responses, and work with salient stakeholders to dissolve the 
mega-crisis in micro- and meso-levels.   
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4.1 Responding to a Mega-crisis 
The design approach, which proposes changing the environment to dissolve a problem [5], 
is the most plausible approach. The main challenge remains an accurate identification of 
the current environment, which calls for a motivational framing of the issue [6]. 
Motivational framing examines the situation for its intolerable state and determines why 
people should care. In order to do this, a political perspective that incorporates the views of 
multiple stakeholders should be adopted.  
 A multivocal approach has been argued to be a feasible process for the gathering of 
stakeholder inputs in a mega-crisis [2]. Within this approach lies the consideration of a 
macro-rhetorical arena and the micro-rhetorical arena [2]. The macro-rhetorical arena 
examines dynamics between different publics and their relationships with each other, 
taking into account cultural and social contexts. The micro-rhetorical arena is an in-depth 
study into each communicative process, which consists of three elements in “crisis 
communication, sender and receiver” and four parameters of “context, media, genre and 
text” [2]. A multivocal approach in mega-crisis communication focuses on the connections 
between stakeholders and how they are forged. 
 Stakeholder salience can inform these connections in the macro-rhetorical arena. The 
stakeholder salience model [23], which singles out three attributes in power, legitimacy, 
and urgency, illustrates what captures the attention of the organization. Power refers to the 
ability to carry out one’s will to the extent of access to coercive (physical force), utilitarian 
(material or finances), or normative (symbols such as prestige, love and acceptance) 
resources. Legitimacy refers to socially accepted and expected structures or behaviors that 
may be interpreted differently at different stages of social organization [24]. And urgency 
refers to an attribute that has a time-sensitive claim that it is critical to the stakeholder. The 
more attributes a stakeholder group can muster or project to the organization, the higher the 
salience.  The stakeholder salience model was later refined in a crisis setting and proposed 
another model with urgency as a key driving force [25].  
 However, in a mega-crisis situation that seeks to find long-term resolutions to a 
complex situation, urgency cannot determine salience. An alternative attribute can be one’s 
ability to adapt to environmental changes over time. In adaptability, there are signs of 
resilience, which also enhances salience in a mega-crisis.  
The dissolution of a mega-crisis (changing the environment to remove a problem), can 
be found in the micro-rhetorical arena. There are conceptual clues that point to how rituals 
can constitute a legitimate mega-crisis response. Design-oriented planning suggests that to 
dissolve a problem, it is “to be carried out as participatory as possible, ideally providing all 
stakeholders – not just their representatives – with an opportunity to take part” [5]. Unlike a 
routine, which consists of habitual actions without meaning, a ritual involves symbolic 
communication [26]. In a ritual, the situation is regarded to be more significant than its 
participants, and its metaphoric interpretation from reality is always purposive [27]. 
Components of a ritual include “group assembly (physical proximity), barrier to outsiders, 
mutual focus of attention, and a shared mood or emotional experience” [28]. Through 
rituals, stakeholders will be able to organize and cope in various groups, take on different 
roles on multiple platforms, and experience a common reality. In summary, the practice of 
multiple rituals by multiple stakeholder groups contributes towards a collective resolution 
of a mega-crisis. Rather than rely on a single resolution, a mega-crisis should be tackled in 
smaller parts that organizations can work with stakeholders on.  
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5 Refining the definition of mega-crisis as a concept 
Based on previous definitions [2, 16], the following conceptual definition for a mega-crisis 
is posited: “A set of interacting crises that is severe in impact, complex in nature and global 
in fallout, with no distinct start and end points.” 
6 Conclusion 
The model offered in this paper provides an analytic framework for comparing similarities 
and differences among problems, messes, crises and mega-crises.  It can also be used to 
identify evolutionary stages of crisis development and targets for crisis management.  That 
is, a well-managed problem does not have to evolve into a set of inter-related problems (a 
mess); a well-managed mess does not have to evolve into a set of interrelated messes (a 
crisis); and a well-managed crisis does not have to evolve into a set of interrelated crises 
(mega-crisis).  A multivocal approach, which includes extensive stakeholder involvement, 
design-oriented planning, and symbolic communication, is a promising approach.  Analytic 
generalization, which involves making projections about the possible transferability of 
findings from an evaluation based on research [29], is another.  For crisis managers to 
confront new mega-crises that await, further research in the form of case studies is needed 
to trace the origins of mega-crises and to construct analytic generalizations.   
References 
1. J. Chomsri, P. Sherer, International Journal of Behavioral Science, 8, 1 (2013) 
2. F. Frandsen, W. Johansen, Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons Ltd (2010) 
3. C. Chase-Dunn & P. Grimes, Annu. Rev. Sociol., 21, 1 (1995) 
4. J. McLeod, Z. Pan, S. Dunwoody, L. Becker, Concept explication and theory 
construction, in S. Dunwoody, L. Becker, D. McLeod, & G. Kosicki (Eds.), Creskill, 
New Jersey, Hampton Press (2005) 
5. R. L. Ackoff, Interfaces, 11, 1 (1981)  
6. D. R. Loseke, J. Best, New York: Aldine de Gruyter (2003) 
7. I. Mitroff, C. Alpaslan, Palo Alto: Stanford University Press (2011) 
8. I. Mitroff, M. C. Alpaslan, S. E. Green, Int. Stud. Rev., 6, 1 (2004) 
9. M. Regester, London: Business Books (1989) 
10. K. Fearn-Banks,  New York: Taylor & Francis (2011) 
11. M. K. Pinsodf, Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company (1987) 
12. O. Lerbinger, New York: Routledge (2012) 
13. B. J. Wrigley, C. T. Salmon, H. S. Park, Public Relat Rev, 29, 3 (2003) 
14. A. L. Hughes, L. Palen, International Journal of Emergency Management, 6, 3-4, 
(2009) 
15. I. Helsloot, A. Boin, B. Jacobs, L. K. Comfort, Springfield, Illinois: Charles C 
Thomas Publisher (2012) 
16. P. Lagadec, The Megacrisis unknown territory – In search of conceptual and strategic 
breakthroughs, in I. Helsloot, A. Boin, B. Jacobs, & L. K. Comfort (Eds.), 12-24, 
Springfield, Illinois: Charles C Thomas Publisher (2012) 
17. M. J. Canel, K. Sanders, The Handbook of Crisis Communication, 449-466, Hoboken, 
New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons Ltd (2010)  
18. P. A. Curtin, Negotiating global citizenship: Mattel’s 2007 recall crisis, in W. T. 
Coombs & S. J. Holladay, (Eds.), The Handbook of Crisis Communication, 449-466, 
Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons Ltd (2010) 
 
    
 
 
DOI: 10.1051/, 00034 (2017) 73300034
 
33SHS Web of Conferences shsconf/201
i-COME'16 
7
  
	
19. P. t Hart, & A. Boin, Between crisis and normalcy: The long shadow of post-crisis 
politics, In U. Rosenthal, A. Boin, & L. Comfort (Eds.), , 28-46, Springfield, Illinois: 
Charles C. Thomas Publisher (2001)  
20. A. Downs, The Public Interest, 28, 38-50 (1972) 
21. C. T. Salmon, H. S. Park, & B. J. Wrigley, J Health Commun, 8, 130-143 (2003) 
22. U. Rosenthal, A. Boin, & L. K. Comfort, Managing crises: Threats, dilemmas, 
opportunities, Springfield, Illinois: Charles C Thomas Publisher (2001) 
23. R. K. Mitchell, B. R. Agle, & D. J. Wood, Academy of Management Review, 22, 4 
(1997) 
24. M. C. Suchman,  Academy of Management Review, 20, 3 (1995) 
25. C. M. Alpaslan, S. E. Green, & I. I. Mitroff, JCCM, 17, 1(2009) 
26. M. Spagnola, & B. H. Friese, Infants & Young Children, 20, 4 (2007) 
27. C. Bell, Ritual theory, ritual practice, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press 
(1992) 
28. R. Collins, Interaction ritual chains, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press (2004) 
29. R. K. Yin, Case study research: Design and methods, Thousand Oaks, California: 
Sage Publications (2009) 
 
 
    
 
 
DOI: 10.1051/, 00034 (2017) 73300034
 
33SHS Web of Conferences shsconf/201
i-COME'16 
8
